Debates about including non-binary athletes, often treated as transgender athletes, have intensified in sport-policy discussions. Accounts contend that current policies are sufficient (Griffin et al. 2019); inclusion threatens women's protections (Lawford-Smith 2026); re-conceptualizing inclusion is too complex (Martínková et al. 2023); or the sex-gender conflation resolves exclusion concerns (Stock 2022). Approaches include sociological (Larsson 2024), policy-oriented (Coggon et al. 2008), fairness-based (Loland 2021, Sailors 2020), administrative (Pike 2020), biological essentialist (Griffin et al. 2019), or normative (Smith forthcoming). Importantly, these often share metaphysical assumptions: one can apply methods used to address women's oppression-by-exclusion (of mere participation) - i.e., determining and resolving what constitutes the oppression (Pavlenko 2024)-to non-binary athletes. For example, women's saber fencing was created to resolve exclusion sustained by interlocking institutional rules and cultural narratives (Frye 2000; Young 1979/2009). Applied to non-binary athletes, this model motivates creating a third gender event or all-gender events (Smith 2025; Harper et al. 2018; Newbould 2015; Reynolds et al. 2021). In this paper, I argue that the aforementioned accounts and approaches are misguided because they misunderstand relevant metaphysical implications. Drawing on Dembroff (2018), Bechter (2014), Jenkins (2016), and MacKinnon (1984), I contend that, because women are subordinated within a recognized social category, whereas non-binary athletes are oppressed through categorical non-recognition, resolving non-binary exclusion in sport requires merging two metaphysically distinct systems, possible only by (1) imagining a third system, or (2) alterating one to comply with the other- an approach resulting in (1) and carrying unpalatable consequences (Anderson et al. 2019; Hirji 2021; Ritchie 2010).

Athletic identity is defined as “the extent to which one identifies with the athletic role” (Brewer et al., 1993). This definition positions athletic identity within identity theory from social psychology, which suggests that individuals can identify with multiple identities that align with roles they play (e.g., mother, friend, colleague) and groups they belong to (e.g., gender, religion) (Stets et al., 2000). In other words, athletic identity is one of many sub-identities an individual may identify with (Geary et al., 2025). This brings us to the current study. Current research in sports psychology has failed to examine the impact of identity as a whole, namely, personal identity, on athletic identity. It is important to investigate, however, given that athletic identity, as a sub-identity, significantly impacts athletic performance. The theoretical work in this paper shows that athletic identity can be causally related to personal identity and, therefore, that personal identity can impact athletic performance. The aims of this study are twofold: (1) to examine the correlation between athletic identity and personal identity, and (2) to develop a feasible research design capable of examining this identity correlation on athletic performance.

This paper explores the relationship between a self-regarding emotion, namely moral shame, and the self. This investigation requires that we carefully parse through existing accounts of the self and of shame to understand what utility comes with shame. What does it mean for us when we experience shame? And what does it mean for others when we ask them to feel shame? These questions are at the center of this paper. I argue that there ought not to be morally justifiable utility to shame because it is harmful to the self. This paper has salient practical implications for today’s society; especially when we consider the use of online shaming and the shaping of personal identity on the internet, considering the interactions between moral shame and the self is of particular importance.